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Streaks in Earnings Surprises and the
Cross-Section of Stock Returns
Roger K. Loh, Mitch Warachka
Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University, Singapore 178899
{rogerloh@smu.edu.sg, mitchell@smu.edu.sg}
The gambler’s fallacy [Rabin, M. 2002. Inference by believers in the law of small numbers. Quart. J. Econom.117(3) 775–816] predicts that trends bias investor expectations. Consistent with this prediction, we find that
investors underreact to streaks of consecutive earnings surprises with the same sign. When the most recent
earnings surprise extends a streak, post-earnings-announcement drift is strong and significant. In contrast, the
drift is negligible following the termination of a streak. Indeed, streaks explain about half of the post-earnings-
announcement drift in our sample. Our results are robust to more general definitions of trends than streaks and
a battery of control variables including the magnitude of earnings surprises and their autocorrelation. Overall,
post-earnings-announcement drift has a significant time-series component that is consistent with the gambler’s
fallacy.
Key words : trends; streaks; gambler’s fallacy; post-earnings-announcement drift
History : Received August 17, 2010; accepted October 16, 2011, by Wei Xiong, finance. Published online in
Articles in Advance February 10, 2012.
1. Introduction
The quasi-Bayesian model of Rabin (2002) demon-
strates that the order in which prior information is
received can influence investor expectations. In par-
ticular, Rabin (2002) predicts that investors underreact
to trends as a result of the gambler’s fallacy. A classic
example of this fallacy is when gamblers at a roulette
wheel incorrectly believe that black is more likely to
occur than red following a string of red draws. Intu-
itively, the gambler’s fallacy is the belief that trends
require immediate “balancing” by the opposite out-
come. The justification for such balancing is to ensure
the distribution of prior outcomes reverts toward a
more symmetric distribution that conforms to one’s
prior beliefs.
Durham et al. (2005) report evidence of the gam-
bler’s fallacy in their study of college football wagers.
In an experimental setting, Asparouhova et al. (2009)
find stronger support for Rabin’s (2002) gambler’s fal-
lacy than the representativeness bias assumed by Bar-
beris et al. (1998; abbreviated BSV hereafter). Whereas
the gambler’s fallacy predicts an underreaction to
trends, the representativeness bias results in the incor-
rect belief that trends will continue, with this extrap-
olation resulting in an overreaction to trends. This
paper uses past earnings surprises (SURPs) to test the
conflicting predictions of the gambler’s fallacy and
representativeness. To our knowledge, we are the first
to employ earnings surprises to evaluate these theo-
ries. The frequency and salience of quarterly earnings
surprises provides an ideal setting to test whether
trends bias investor expectations. Indeed, BSV illus-
trate their model by conditioning investor expecta-
tions on prior earnings surprises.
Our main definition for a trend is a streak of consec-
utive earnings surprises with the same sign. Our first
trading strategy ignores the magnitude of earnings
surprises and buys stocks with positive streaks while
selling stocks with negative streaks. This strategy is
also implemented for reversals, which occur when
the most recent earnings surprise is of the opposite
sign as the preceding streak. Thus, reversals signify
the termination of streaks. Over a six-month holding
period, a four-factor alpha of 0.603% per month is
obtained from buying stocks with positive streaks and
selling stocks with negative streaks, where the respec-
tive streak lengths are at least two. In contrast, the
returns from conditioning on reversals are insignif-
icant. The economically and statistically significant
risk-adjusted return from conditioning on streaks is
available despite our sample consisting of relatively
large stocks with analyst coverage. Furthermore, the
positive risk-adjusted return from this trading strat-
egy supports the gambler’s fallacy because investors
appear to underreact to streaks. Underreaction coef-
ficients that compare announcement period returns
with returns over a longer subsequent horizon (Cohen
and Frazzini 2008, DellaVigna and Pollet 2009) pro-
vide further evidence that investors underreact to
streaks.
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Our second trading strategy accounts for the mag-
nitude of the most recent earnings surprise. The
return difference between stocks with extremely high
and stocks with extremely low earnings surprises in
the most recent quarter is known as post-earnings-
announcement drift (PEAD) in the return anomalies
literature. After sorting firms into quintiles accord-
ing to the magnitude of their most recent earnings
surprise, we further subdivide these quintiles into
subportfolios of streaks and reversals. We then buy
stocks with positive streaks in the highest quintile
and sell stocks with negative streaks in the lowest
quintile. This strategy yields a four-factor adjusted
return of 0.882% per month. Once again, an insignifi-
cant return is obtained from conditioning on reversals
(0.044%). The return difference between conditioning
on streaks and reversals is 0.838% (t = 5075). Fama–
MacBeth regressions confirm the marginal return pre-
dictability of streaks after accounting for a battery
of control variables that include lagged earnings sur-
prises. Therefore, the greater return predictability of
streaks relative to reversals is not attributable to the
return continuation induced by same-signed earnings
surprises before the most recent quarter.
We also examine conditional sorts to determine
whether the magnitude of earnings surprises within
streaks and reversals have different return implica-
tions. After forming streak and reversal portfolios, we
sort stocks into quintiles according to the magnitude
of their most recent earnings surprise. This condi-
tional double sort reveals that PEAD is concentrated
within streaks. We find no evidence that PEAD is sig-
nificant within the reversal portfolio. We also exam-
ine the impact of streaks on the time-series dynamics
of PEAD by constructing a streak factor from the
returns of our first trading strategy that buys stocks
with positive streaks and sells those with negative
streaks. This streak factor accounts for the majority
of PEAD’s four-factor alpha. A more broadly defined
factor, which is not limited to positive and negative
streaks, that buys all stocks with positive earnings
surprises and sells those with negative earnings sur-
prises in the most recent quarter explains a similar
portion of PEAD’s four-factor alpha. Therefore, the
sign of the most recent earnings surprise is only rele-
vant to PEAD when it identifies a prevailing streak.
The existing literature has examined the contempo-
raneous impact of streaks on stock prices. Barth et al.
(1999) as well as Myers et al. (2007) document that
firms with increasing earnings have higher valuations
but large price reversals following the termination of
earnings increases. Ke et al. (2003) report that insiders
and institutions anticipate the termination of streaks.
However, these studies focus on the contemporane-
ous implications of streaks. In contrast, our inves-
tigation focuses on future returns by implementing
calendar-time trading strategies that capture return
predictability. Results in the existing literature that
find greater contemporaneous price reactions to rever-
sals than streaks are consistent with the gambler’s fal-
lacy because the underreactions to trends predicted
by the gambler’s fallacy imply muted contempora-
neous price reactions followed by a subsequent drift
in prices. Our paper is further distinguished from
the existing literature given our focus on analyst-
based earnings surprises that account for earnings
predictability. Chan et al. (2004) confine their study
to streaks consisting of four consecutive quarters of
above-median (below-median) earnings growth rela-
tive to the entire cross-section of firms. In contrast,
our use of analyst-based earnings surprises better
conforms to the assumptions underlying the theories
of BSV and Rabin (2002). Another related branch of
literature explores the relationship between streaks
and order flow. Frieder (2008) concludes that posi-
tive earnings streaks lead to the initiation of small
buy trades. However, Battalio and Mendenhall (2005)
report limited success at explaining PEAD using
small trades, whereas Shanthikumar (2009) reports
that large trades are not initiated by streaks. Instead of
examining the microstructure implications of streaks,
our paper examines their implications for return
predictability.
An alternative interpretation of our findings is that
earnings surprises are positively autocorrelated, and
investors underestimate this autocorrelation. Bernard
and Thomas (1990) hypothesize that PEAD is caused
by investors underestimating the autocorrelation in
realized earnings changes. Our analyst-based earn-
ings surprises are less autocorrelated than earn-
ings surprises defined by realized earnings changes
because analysts can incorporate earnings predictabil-
ity into their forecasts. Nonetheless, we test this
alternative explanation by examining whether streaks
predict returns better than reversals for firms that
have autocorrelated earnings surprises. Autocorrela-
tion is assessed using the runs test as well as an
autoregressive model with four lags. After classifying
firms into subsamples depending on whether their
earnings surprises are autocorrelated or independent,
we find that investors underreact more to streaks than
reversals in both subsets. Thus, the gambler’s fallacy,
rather than autocorrelation, is driving the return pre-
dictability of streaks.1
Besides streaks, we also examine a more general
definition of trends that relies on consistency within
the sign of prior earnings surprises. Under the con-
sistency criteria, a trend occurs when the most recent
1 Rabin and Vayanos (2010) demonstrate that the gambler’s fal-
lacy can induce an underreaction to trends within autocorrelated
signals.
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quarterly earnings surprise has the same sign as the
majority of prior earnings surprises. Thus, when the
majority of a firm’s prior earnings surprises are posi-
tive, a positive earnings surprise produces a positive
trend, whereas a negative earnings surprise produces
a negative reversal. We examine imbalances defined
by the majority (50%) of earnings surprises over sev-
eral horizons. Imbalances proxy for the likelihood
functions underlying the quasi-Bayesian theories that
motivate our empirical tests.2 We continue to find that
trends predict returns significantly better than rever-
sals using the consistency-based definition of trends.
Finally, we also examine whether the gambler’s
fallacy is unconditionally weaker for long streaks.
Rabin (2002) predicts the gambler’s fallacy is under-
mined by the hot-hands phenomenon when investors
update their beliefs after observing a long streak.
However, we find no unconditional evidence of the
hot-hands phenomenon. Intuitively, investors do not
appear to update their beliefs regarding future earn-
ings growth after observing long streaks. This prop-
erty is consistent with investors having strong prior
beliefs that earnings growth will mean revert in the
long term. We also examine whether the gambler’s
fallacy is conditionally weaker for long streaks when
investors have diffuse priors regarding future earn-
ings. We proxy for such diffuse priors using high
earnings volatility and high analyst forecast disper-
sion. As predicted by Rabin (2002), we find weaker
evidence of the gambler’s fallacy following long
streaks in the subset of firms with high earnings
volatility and high forecast dispersion.
The remainder of this paper begins in §2 with
a discussion of the relevant theory. Section 3 then
describes the data underlying our empirical tests. The
results of these empirical tests are contained in §4,
and §5 details their robustness. Section 6 contains our
conclusions.
2. Motivation
Rabin (2002) and BSV assume that the interpreta-
tion of a signal is influenced by the sign of previous
signals. In our empirical study, an underreaction to
a trend has investors discounting the most recent
earnings surprise’s importance to future earnings,
whereas an overreaction to a trend has investors mag-
nifying its importance to future earnings.
The gambler’s fallacy in Rabin (2002) posits an
underreaction to trends. This fallacy arises from an
2 The consistency definition encompasses streaks as a special case.
For example, a streak of four consecutive positive surprises requires
the most recent surprise to be positive while also requiring the pos-
itive imbalance in the prior three surprises to equal its maximum
of 100%. In contrast, the consistency definition does not require
the signs of the most recent and the second most recent earnings
surprise to be identical.
informative prior regarding the likelihood of pos-
itive and negative signals, such as the belief that
the long-term distribution is 50% positive and 50%
negative. The gambler’s fallacy causes Rabin’s (2002)
investor to expect a trend to reverse rather than con-
tinue. The resulting underreaction to trends yields
the empirical prediction of more pronounced drifts
after trends than after reversals. Intuitively, Rabin’s
(2002) investor believes that trends require immedi-
ate “balancing” by future signals of the opposite sign.
Although this belief is correct when the number of
signals is large, it does not necessarily hold true for a
small number of signals. Indeed, the gambler’s fallacy
is also known as the law of small numbers.
In contrast to Rabin (2002), BSV assume that rep-
resentativeness causes investors to expect a con-
tinuation of trends. This extrapolation induces an
overreaction to trends that differs from Rabin’s (2002)
prediction. To ensure that stock prices eventually con-
verge to their true value, the return implications of
trends and reversals are equal in absolute magnitude
but of the opposite sign in BSV’s model. In contrast,
long-term returns reversals are not required to correct
mispricings attributable to investors underreactions.
Asparouhova et al. (2009) emphasize the disparity
between the empirical predictions of the gambler’s
fallacy and representativeness. Although the empir-
ical market in Bloomfield and Hales (2002) pro-
vides empirical support for BSV’s predictions, the
Asparouhova et al. (2009) revised experiment sup-
ports the predictions of Rabin (2002).
Quarterly earnings surprises provide an ideal proxy
for public signals. Indeed, these signals motivate
BSV’s theoretical model. Furthermore, earnings sur-
prises defined by analyst forecasts are less autocor-
related than earnings surprises defined by realized
earnings because earnings predictability can be incor-
porated into analyst forecasts.
3. Data
Our sample of quarterly earnings forecasts is from
Thomson Financial’s Institutional Brokers Estimate
System (I/B/E/S) U.S. file from 1984 to 2009. Instead
of using the standard adjusted summary file, we
split-adjust the unadjusted file ourselves using the
I/B/E/S adjustment factors. This mitigates the prob-
lem of imprecise forecasts caused by I/B/E/S’s prac-
tice of rounding to the nearest cent when adjusting
historical consensus forecasts after stock splits (as
documented by Diether et al. 2002). Our procedure
ensures that the actual earnings and the consensus
forecasts are on the same per-share basis for each fore-
casting firm-quarter and are comparable over time for
a firm.
Monthly returns are obtained from the Center
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) for stocks
Loh and Warachka: Streaks in Earnings Surprises and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns
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classified as ordinary shares (share codes 10 or 11).
Delisting returns are added from the CRSP delist-
ing file. When the delisting return is missing, we
adopt the convention used by Shumway (1997) and
use −30% if the corresponding delisting code is per-
formance related. Firms in the sample are required
to have a nonnegative book-to-market (BM) ratio.
Book equity is calculated following Fama and French
(2006). A firm’s BM ratio is updated every 12 months
beginning in July, where B denotes its book equity
for the fiscal year ending in the preceding calendar
year and M denotes its December-end market cap-
italization from the preceding calendar year. SURPs
are computed as actual quarterly earnings minus the
most recent mean consensus forecast of analysts for
that quarter. This difference is then normalized by the
firm’s stock price on CRSP at the end of the prior
month. We adjust the CRSP stock price to ensure that
it is on the same per-share basis as the SURP. Actual
earnings are from I/B/E/S. Our primary definition
for a trend is a streak of at least two consecutive earn-
ings surprises with the same sign while a reversal
occurs upon the termination of a streak of at least two.
A more general definition for trends involving the
imbalance between positive and negative prior earn-
ings surprises is evaluated in a later robustness test.
Panel A of Table 1 describes our sample. The aver-
age SURP in our 1984 to 2009 sample period is
−00052. When classifying SURPs as a streak or rever-
sal, our sample begins in 1987 to obtain three years
of prior earnings surprises. Differences in the book-
to-market, size, and past returns (PRET) between
streaks and reversals are reported in Panel B. PRET
denotes the buy-and-hold returns over the past 12
months after omitting the most recent month. Addi-
tional firm characteristics include Amihud’s (2002)
illiquidity measure, percentage of institutional own-
ership (IO) defined by a firm’s most recent quarterly
13F filing, and turnover. Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity
measure is computed in the month prior to portfolio
formation as a firm’s average daily absolute return
divided by the dollar volume (in millions). Turnover
is defined as the average daily number of shares
traded normalized by the number of shares outstand-
ing and is also computed in the month before portfo-
lio formation. For NASDAQ firms, volume is adjusted
to account for interdealer double counting as in Gao
and Ritter (2010). The firm characteristics are com-
puted as Fama–MacBeth averages. Specifically, the
characteristics within each portfolio are averaged each
month before computing the time-series averages of
each portfolio. Although differences between the firm
characteristics of streaks and reversals are statistically
significant, several of these differences are unlikely to
have economic consequences. Nonetheless, for com-
pleteness, we control for the firm characteristics in
Panel B of Table 1 in later cross-sectional regressions.
After sorting stocks into quintiles according the
magnitude of their most recent earnings surprise,
stocks are then separated into subportfolios con-
taining streaks and reversals. For each subportfolio,
Panel A of Table 2 reports the number of positive
versus negative SURPs, and Panel B reports the aver-
age SURP magnitude within each quintile. In general,
positive streaks (reversals) occur more frequently than
negative streaks (reversals) according to Panel A.
However, Panel B indicates that negative SURPs are
larger in absolute value than positive SURPs, a prop-
erty that is consistent with the average SURP in
Panel A of Table 1 being negative.
4. Empirical Results
This section reports the calendar-time returns from
two trading strategies. The first is derived exclusively
from the sign of prior earnings surprises, whereas the
second also conditions on the magnitude of the most
recent earnings surprise. We then use Fama–MacBeth
regressions involving individual firm returns and
characteristics to reexamine the portfolio-level results
from these trading strategies.
4.1. Streaks
We begin by examining the returns following streaks
in earnings surprises of various lengths and their sub-
sequent reversals. A streak is defined by earnings sur-
prises having the same sign in consecutive quarters.
An earnings surprise that equals zero is classified as
being negative. An alternative threshold using the
median SURP to determine the signs of surprises
is examined in the next section. Equally weighted
monthly returns following positive streaks and nega-
tive streaks are first computed over six-month holding
periods. The time-series averages of these returns are
then recorded along with the returns following posi-
tive reversals and negative reversals that occur when
the most recent earnings surprise is of the opposite
sign as the prevailing streak. As in the existing lit-
erature, our trading strategies exclude firms whose
lagged stock prices are below five dollars to guard
against microstructure complications such as bid-ask
bounce. To benchmark the returns from our trading
strategies, we compute risk-adjusted returns using the
three-factor (Fama and French 1993) and four-factor
models as well as the characteristic portfolio proce-
dure of Daniel et al. (1997; abbreviated DGTW). 3
3 To form DGTW portfolios, every July, firms are first sorted into
quintiles based on their market capitalization on June 30th of each
year using New York Stock Exchange break points. Second, within
each size portfolio, firms are then sorted into quintiles according
to their BM ratios. Third, firms within each double-sorted size–
BM portfolio are sorted once more into momentum quintiles every
month based on their buy-and-hold return over the prior 12 months
Loh and Warachka: Streaks in Earnings Surprises and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns
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Table 1 Summary Statistics for Earnings Surprises
Panel A: Average firm characteristics by year
Number of Number of Number Percentage
Year firms firm-months SURP Beta BM Size of streaks of streaks
1984 941 11675 −00014 1009 0079 11045 — —
1985 11364 121813 −00049 1014 0084 11086 — —
1986 11472 141304 −00054 1023 0079 11331 — —
1987 11689 151635 −00043 1011 0071 11564 81982 0057
1988 11761 151590 −00028 1014 0074 11614 81958 0057
1989 21144 191633 −00069 1015 0077 11374 111297 0058
1990 21220 201463 −00028 1014 0071 11508 121159 0059
1991 21278 211674 −00062 1019 0079 11555 121899 0060
1992 21500 231825 −00053 1020 0082 11579 141418 0061
1993 21872 261642 −00072 1030 0066 11649 161375 0061
1994 31406 311021 −00056 1025 0058 11555 181910 0061
1995 31724 341603 −00030 1017 0059 11572 211565 0062
1996 41048 371588 −00003 1009 0058 11818 221875 0061
1997 41435 401167 −00027 1012 0053 21197 241997 0062
1998 41463 391942 −00021 1001 0049 21831 241442 0061
1999 41202 371939 −00023 1014 0051 31647 231900 0063
2000 41075 351049 00016 1010 0055 41590 221121 0063
2001 31426 301785 00019 1002 0063 51155 181537 0060
2002 31175 291439 −00001 0092 0064 41622 171834 0061
2003 31105 291772 −00081 1003 0065 41153 181154 0061
2004 31258 321133 −00025 1014 0061 41247 191288 0060
2005 31250 311885 −00001 1016 0049 41725 181810 0059
2006 31325 321742 00000 1045 0049 41899 191535 0060
2007 31313 321509 −00598 1051 0048 51480 191235 0059
2008 31055 291229 −00003 1025 0052 51975 171435 0060
2009 21732 251849 −00004 1010 0076 51114 151567 0060
Overall 91706 7021906 −00052 1016 0061 31245 4081293 0061
Panel B: Average firm characteristics for streaks and reversals
SURP Size BM PRET IO Amihud Turnover
Streaks −00037 31304 0061 00185 00531 0050 00561
Reversals −00003 31023 0063 00164 00512 0063 00535
Difference −00034∗∗∗ 281∗∗∗ −0002∗∗∗ 00021∗∗∗ 00019∗∗∗ −0013∗∗∗ 00026∗∗∗
Notes. This table describes our sample of earnings surprises as well as the streaks defined by these surprises. SURP is the
firm’s quarterly earnings surprise defined as I/B/E/S actual earnings minus the most recent mean consensus estimate, scaled
by the stock price. Streaks occur when the two most recent quarterly SURPs are of the same sign. Reversals occur when such
a streak has ended. For each year in our 1984 to 2009 sample period, the average SURP is reported in Panel A along with the
average market beta, BM ratio, and size (millions of dollars) of the firms in our sample. The number and percentage of streaks
are also reported in Panel A. Streaks are defined beginning in 1987 to obtain an initial history of prior SURPs. An extended set
of firm characteristics are summarized (as Fama–MacBeth averages) in Panel B for streaks and reversals. These characteristics
include returns over the past 12 months while omitting the most recent month (PRET), IO, Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure
(Amihud), and turnover.
∗10%, ∗∗5%, and ∗∗∗1% statistical significance of the difference in the time-series average of the firm characteristic.
The main results of our paper are summarized in
Table 3. Panel A reports a cross-sectional four-factor
alpha of 0.322% (t = 4032) per month from buying
stocks with positive streaks and a negligible 0.080%
(t = 1021) from buying stocks with positive rever-
sals. The difference of 0.242% is statistically significant
while omitting the most recent month (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993).
Therefore, the size and BM rankings are updated annually, whereas
the momentum rankings are updated monthly. Finally, equally
weighted monthly returns are computed within each characteristic
portfolio.
(t = 3097). Similarly, the four-factor alpha following
negative streaks exceeds that of negative reversals by
−00362% (t = 6034).4 Taken together, a trading strat-
egy that is long positive streaks and short negative
streaks earns a four-factor alpha of 0.603% per month,
whereas applying the same strategy to reversals earns
4 Excluding firms that are delisted during the holding period results
in a negligible reduction in the number of stocks contained in the
short portfolio as well as the long portfolio, and does not alter
their risk-adjusted returns. Therefore, delistings are not driving the
return predictability of negative streaks.
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Table 2 Summary Statistics for Streaks and Reversals
Panel A: Number of observations
SURP sign SURP quintile
Streak length Negative Positive Smallest 2 3 4 Largest
2 721760 741533 291625 241488 331846 281983 301351
3 431477 441507 191013 131993 191362 171825 171791
4 261750 271677 121221 81196 111936 111362 101712
5 171398 181905 71911 51441 81001 71693 71257
6 111592 121898 51228 31542 51620 51584 41516
7 71584 81917 31345 21398 31784 31848 31126
8 51017 51992 21195 11525 21815 21551 11923
9 31363 41273 11525 937 11935 11861 11378
≥10 81326 111255 31316 21460 51683 41676 31446
All Streaks 1961267 2081957 841379 621980 921982 841383 801500
Reversals 721113 751823 231881 261796 381271 281305 301683
Panel B: Average SURP magnitude (×100)
SURP sign SURP quintile
Streak length Negative Positive Smallest 2 3 4 Largest
2 −1031 0053 −3013 −0010 0002 0013 1016
3 −1097 0044 −4044 −0010 0002 0013 0094
4 −1065 0044 −3055 −0010 0002 0013 0097
5 −3021 0044 −6099 −0010 0002 0013 0099
6 −4028 0035 −9043 −0010 0002 0013 0081
7 −2027 0034 −5007 −0010 0002 0013 0078
8 −2043 0031 −5049 −0010 0002 0013 0075
9 −1045 0030 −3014 −0010 0002 0013 0074
≥10 −1063 0027 −4003 −0009 0002 0013 0068
All Streaks −1093 0045 −4041 −0010 0002 0013 1000
Reversals −1015 0065 −3036 −0010 0002 0013 1048
Notes. This table reports the frequency of streaks and reversals during our 1987 to 2009 sample period. Firms are sorted into quintiles each month based
on their most recent SURP. A quarterly SURP denotes a firm’s quarterly earnings surprise, defined as I/B/E/S actual earnings minus the most recent mean
consensus estimate of analysts, scaled by its stock price. Streaks occur when the two most recent quarterly SURPs are of the same sign. Reversals occur
when such a streak has ended. Panel A reports the number of observations, and Panel B the average SURP (multiplied by 100). All SURPs are winsorized at
the extreme 0.1 percentiles for each monthly cross-section. SURPs greater than zero are classified as positive, whereas values equaling zero or below zero are
classified as negative.
−00001%. This difference in return predictability is
statistically significant with a t-statistic of 5.66. Similar
risk adjusted returns are reported for the three-factor
model and the DGTW risk adjustment. This evidence
strongly supports the gambler’s fallacy, which pre-
dicts that investors underreact to trends but not to
reversals. This result is also consistent with the con-
clusion by Chan et al. (1996) that earnings momentum
is the result of investor underreaction.
The return difference between portfolios containing
stocks with extremely high and extremely low past
earnings surprise is referred to as PEAD. To eval-
uate the contribution of streaks to PEAD, we first
sort stocks into quintiles according to the magni-
tude of their most recent SURP.5 Streak and reversal
subportfolios within each earnings surprise quintile
are then formed. The risk-adjusted returns of these
calendar-time portfolios are reported in Panel B
5 The middle quintile contains more stocks than adjacent quintiles
because of the large number of SURPs that are zero.
of Table 3. A trading strategy that buys stocks
with positive streaks in the largest SURP quin-
tile and sells stocks with negative streaks in the
smallest SURP quintile yields a four-factor alpha of
0.882% per month. In contrast, conditioning on rever-
sals leads to an insignificant risk-adjusted return
of 0.044% (t = 0048). The difference in return pre-
dictability between streaks and reversals is large and
significant (0.838%, t = 5075). Panel B indicates that
differences in the three-factor and four-factor alphas
following streaks and reversals are significant in every
SURP quintile except for the middle quintile.6 These
risk-adjusted returns are also symmetric (in absolute
6 Another procedure matched the magnitude of the most recent
SURP within streaks and reversals. This procedure ensures the
streak and reversal portfolios contain an equal number of stocks.
In unreported results, the results from this procedure are nearly
identical to those in Table 3. Therefore, the greater return pre-
dictability of streaks in comparison to reversals is not attributable
to differences in the magnitude of earnings surprises.
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Table 3 Trading Strategies Using Streaks and Reversals
Panel A: SURP Signs Panel B: SURP quintiles
Negative Positive Spread Smallest 2 3 4 Largest Spread
Four-factor alphas
Streaks −00280∗∗∗ 00322∗∗∗ 00603∗∗∗ −00444∗∗∗ −00157∗ 00071 00263∗∗∗ 00438∗∗∗ 008826∗∗∗
4−30785 440325 480125 4−50235 4−10795 400885 420955 450415 480925
Reversals 00081 00080 −00001 00056 00097 00118 00068 00101 00044
410145 410215 4−00015 400725 410205 410285 400785 410195 400485
Difference −00362∗∗∗ 00242∗∗∗ 00603∗∗∗ −00500∗∗∗ −00254∗∗∗ −00047 00194∗∗ 00337∗∗∗ 00838∗∗∗
4−60345 430975 450665 4−50835 4−30665 4−00865 420575 430995 450755
Fama–French (1993) three-factor alphas
Streaks −00375∗∗∗ 00287∗∗∗ 00663∗∗∗ −00561∗∗∗ −00242∗∗∗ 00036 00224∗∗ 00397∗∗∗ 00957∗∗∗
4−40695 430865 480735 4−60055 4−20655 400455 420545 440915 490515
Reversals −00020 00059 00078 −00070 00028 00052 00032 00087 00158
4−00255 400895 410265 4−00795 400345 400565 400375 410055 410595
Difference −00356∗∗∗ 00229∗∗∗ 00584∗∗∗ −00491∗∗∗ −00270∗∗∗ −00016 00192∗∗ 00309∗∗∗ 00800∗∗∗
4−60345 430815 450565 4−50815 4−30955 4−00295 420585 430705 450565
DGTW-adjusted average returns
Streaks −00239∗∗∗ 00144∗∗∗ 00383∗∗∗ −00391∗∗∗ −00129∗∗ 00011 00078 00236∗∗∗ 00627∗∗∗
4−30875 430015 450745 4−40865 4−20165 400215 410465 430465 460525
Reversals −00033 00035 00068 −00064 −00011 00021 00013 00056 00120
4−00665 400645 410285 4−00915 4−00205 400355 400195 400725 410395
Difference −00206∗∗∗ 00109∗∗ 00315∗∗∗ −00328∗∗∗ −00118∗∗ −00010 00065 00179∗∗ 00507∗∗∗
4−30985 410985 430285 4−40125 4−10985 4−00215 400975 420175 430705
Average number of stocks per month
Streaks 1,132 1,202 572 478 704 624 546
Reversals 664 654 197 251 342 249 273
Notes. This table reports the returns from calendar-time trading strategies involving streaks and reversals in earnings surprises from 1987 to 2009. SURP is the
firm’s quarterly earnings surprise defined as I/B/E/S actual earnings minus the most recent mean consensus estimate, scaled by its stock price. Each month,
based on the most recent SURP, firms are sorted into SURP portfolios according to the sign (Panel A) of its SURP or its quintile rank (Panel B). Stocks having
streaks whose length is at least two are also independently separated into streak portfolios and reversal portfolios. Stocks remain in the relevant portfolio for
six months, although stocks with lagged prices below five dollars are excluded from our trading strategies. Equally weighted returns are computed each month,
and the time series of these monthly returns less the risk-free rate are regressed on the three-factor or four-factor models to obtain alpha estimates that are
reported as percentages. DGTW-adjusted returns are also reported using the methodology in Daniel et al. (1997).
∗10%, ∗∗5%, and ∗∗∗1% statistical significance of the abnormal returns, with the associated t-statistics in parentheses.
value) across the SURP quintiles, although nega-
tive streaks are generally associated with slightly
stronger return predictability. In summary, the results
from Table 3 support the gambler’s fallacy because
investors appear to underreact to streaks.
To complement our study of monthly holding-
period returns, we examine the immediate reaction
of investors to earnings announcements by estimat-
ing underreaction coefficients. These coefficients are
also estimated by Cohen and Frazzini (2008) and
DellaVigna and Pollet (2009). Underreaction coeffi-
cients involve cumulative abnormal returns over a
three-day horizon (CARs) and risk-adjusted returns
over a longer six-month horizon (Drift). These returns
yield an underreaction coefficient defined as
R = CARs
CARs+Drift 1 (1)
for an individual firm’s quarterly earnings announce-
ment. Provided the CARs and Drift following an
earnings announcement have the same sign, a ratio
R < 1 is evidence of investor underreaction, whereas
R> 1 is evidence of investor overreaction. Moreover,
a lower R ratio indicates a greater underreaction by
investors, because less information is immediately
incorporated into prices.
Figure 1 reports the underreaction coefficient for
streaks as well as reversals. We compute Fama–
MacBeth averages for the CARs and Drift variables
for firms within a specific portfolio and then graph R
using these averages. For positive SURPs, the R coef-
ficient for streaks is 68%, compared to 88% for rever-
sals. By implication, there is greater underreaction to
streaks than to reversals. We find similar evidence for
negative SURPs as well as for stocks in the lowest and
highest SURP quintiles. Hence, the evidence in Fig-
ure 1 supports our earlier finding that streaks induce
a greater underreaction than reversals.
4.2. Streak Length
According to Rabin (2002), if investors are uncer-
tain about the distribution of future signals, the hot-
hands phenomenon can undermine the gambler’s
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Figure 1 Underreaction Coefficients for Streaks and Reversals
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Notes. These average coefficients are specified in terms of the sign and mag-
nitude of a firm’s most recent earnings surprise. A quarterly SURP is defined
as the I/B/E/S actual earnings for a particular quarter minus the mean consen-
sus analyst earnnigs forecast for that quarter, scaled by the stock price. For
each month from 1987 to 2009, based on the most recent SURP, firms are
sorted into SURP quintiles as well as positive SURP and negative SURP port-
folios. The underreaction coefficients are defined using cumulative abnormal
returns following a three-day horizon (CARs) following quarterly earnings
announcements and risk-adjusted returns over a longer six-month horizon
(Drift) as follows: R = CARs/4CARs + Drift 5. The averages are computed
using a Fama–MacBeth approach. First, quarterly cross-sectional average
CARs and Drifts are computed, with the time-series averages of these cross-
sectional averages defined as the underreaction coefficient R. A lower R ratio
is evidence of a greater underreaction by investors because less information
is immediately incorporated into prices.
fallacy. The hot-hands effect implies that investors
overinfer after observing a long streak and expect
the streak’s continuation. However, we show in
Table 4 that longer streaks induce stronger rather than
weaker underreaction.7 These results are consistent
with investors having strong prior beliefs regarding
the long-term distribution of earnings surprises that
prevent the gambler’s fallacy from being undermined
by the hot-hands phenomenon. Indeed, after observ-
ing the continuation of a streak, investors appear to
remain confident in its subsequent reversal.
The lack of empirical support for the hot-hands
phenomenon may stem from competition between
7 Compared to streaks whose length is between six and nine quar-
ters, the slightly weaker return predictability following streaks
longer than 10 consecutive quarters is driven by relatively
few stocks.
firms, because the entrance and exit of firms from
a competitive industry leads to mean reversion in
long-term earnings growth at the firm level. The
empirical evidence in Chan et al. (2003) confirms
that high long-term earnings growth is unlikely to
persist. Therefore, informative priors regarding long-
term earnings growth are justified by the belief that a
firm’s competitive advantage is temporary. Moreover,
analysts can adjust their earnings forecasts to mitigate
predictability in SURPs and therefore limit the contin-
uation of streaks.
Although the hot-hands phenomenon is not
detected in our study, it may explain flows into
funds that outperform their peers provided investors
chase fund performance. Jagannathan et al. (2010)
find evidence of persistence among superior hedge
funds. Intuitively, if the long-term investment skill of
fund managers is believed to be more persistent than
the long-term earnings growth of individual firms,
then the hot-hands phenomenon is more likely to be
detected in fund flows than in stock returns.8
4.3. Streaks vs. the Magnitude of
Earnings Surprises
This subsection alters the double sort underlying our
second trading strategy to investigate the return pre-
dictability of large earnings surprises within streaks
and reversals. Within the streak and reversal port-
folios, we sort stocks in quintiles according to the
magnitude of their most recent SURP. As reported in
Panel A of Table 5, after controlling for streaks, cross-
sectional differences across the magnitude of the most
recent quarter’s SURP generate cross-sectional return
variation in all quintiles except the middle (third)
quintile. The significant four-factor alpha in the sec-
ond and fourth quintiles indicate that the magnitude
of the most recent SURP is relatively less important
than streaks.
We also show that the ability of large earnings sur-
prises to influence future returns is limited to streaks.
In particular, within the reversal portfolio, the mag-
nitude of a firm’s most recent SURP does not impact
future returns, because neither the smallest nor largest
earnings surprises are associated with risk-adjusted
holding-period returns.
We further examine the influence of streaks on
PEAD, which is defined as the hedged portfolio
return from buying stocks in Quintile 5 and sell-
ing those in Quintile 1 across the universe of stocks.
We construct a streak factor defined as the monthly
8 Dorsey-Palmer and Smith (2004) find evidence of hot hands in
bowling and argue that Tversky and Gilovich (1989a, b) fail to find
hot hands in basketball because of competitive reactions to recent
success. In particular, unlike bowling, opposing players in basket-
ball can alter their defensive strategy against “hot” players.
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Table 4 Returns Based on Streak Length
SURP quintiles
Smallest 2 3 4 Largest Spread
Abnormal returns based on streak length
Streaks of 2 to 3 −00325∗∗∗ −00095 00105 00197∗∗ 00454∗∗∗ 00780∗∗∗
4−30705 4−10065 410225 420285 450915 480535
Streaks of 4 to 5 −00537∗∗∗ −00302∗∗∗ −00026 00254∗∗ 00383∗∗∗ 00920∗∗∗
4−40935 4−20745 4−00265 420385 430515 460295
Streaks of 6 to 9 −00760∗∗∗ −00190 00053 00358∗∗∗ 00426∗∗∗ 10186∗∗∗
4−50625 4−10355 400505 420675 420865 450585
Streaks ≥ 10 −00670∗∗∗ −00274 00127 00654∗∗∗ 00450∗ 10120∗∗∗
4−20995 4−10365 400855 430225 410765 430495
Reversals 00056 00098 00118 00068 00101 00044
400725 410215 410285 400785 410195 400485
Difference between streaks and reversals
Streaks of 2 to 3 −00382∗∗∗ −00193∗∗∗ −00013 00129∗ 00354∗∗∗ 00735∗∗∗
4−40455 4−20885 4−00235 410805 440805 450545
Streaks of 4 to 5 −00593∗∗∗ −00400∗∗∗ −00144∗ 00186∗ 00283∗∗ 00876∗∗∗
4−50365 4−30935 4−10755 410905 420415 440715
Streaks of 6 to 9 −00816∗∗∗ −00288∗∗ −00065 00290∗∗ 00326∗∗ 10142∗∗∗
4−50885 4−20155 4−00715 420375 420135 440695
Streaks ≥ 10 −00727∗∗∗ −00372∗ 00009 00586∗∗∗ 00349 10076∗∗∗
4−20335 4−10525 4−00885 410645 420465 430325
Average number of stocks per month
Streaks of 2 to 3 363 320 433 373 363
Streaks of 4 to 5 164 117 175 167 144
Streaks of 6 to 9 94 66 117 112 81
Streaks ≥ 10 26 18 45 41 25
Reversals 197 251 342 249 273
Notes. This table reports the returns from calendar-time trading strategies involving streaks, and reversals in earnings surprises from
1987 to 2009. Streak lengths are determined by consecutive same-signed SURPs over 2 to 3, 4 to 5, 6 to 9, or greater than 10 quarters,
respectively. A reversal occurs when a streak whose length is at least two ends. SURP denotes a firm’s quarterly earnings surprise
defined as the I/B/E/S actual earnings minus the most recent mean consensus estimate, scaled by its stock price. Each month, based
on the most recent SURP, firms are sorted into SURP quintiles according to their most recent SURP. Stocks are also independently
separated into streak-length portfolios and reversal portfolios. The stock remains in the relevant portfolio for six months, and stocks
with lagged prices below five dollars are excluded from the holding-period returns. Equally weighted returns are computed each month
and the time series of these monthly returns less the risk-free rate are regressed on the four-factor model to obtain alpha estimates
that are reported as a percentages.
∗10%, ∗∗5%, and ∗∗∗1% statistical significance, with the associated t-statistics in parentheses.
long minus short return of our first trading strat-
egy in Table 3, Panel A, that buys stocks with pos-
itive streaks and sells stocks with negative streaks.
Model 1 in Panel B of Table 5 reports that PEAD’s
four-factor alpha equals 0.648% per month. According
to Model 2, the streak factor can explain 70% of this
alpha, which is reduced to 0.196% per month after its
inclusion.
One concern is that the streak factor’s success at
explaining PEAD may simply result from the sign of
the most recent SURP. If this were the case, a fac-
tor that does not include streaks but conditions on
the sign of SURPs in the most recent quarter would
have similar success at reducing PEAD’s alpha. How-
ever, Model 3 demonstrates that this SURP-sign factor
explains only 13% of PEAD’s alpha. Furthermore, the
inclusion of both the streak factor and the SURP-sign
factor in Model 4 explains 76% of PEAD’s four-factor
alpha, which is not a large improvement over the
streak factor’s 70%. We also orthogonalize the streak
factor against the SURP-sign factor in Model 5. This
purged streak factor continues to remove 54% of
PEAD’s four-factor alpha. Thus, the majority of PEAD
is attributable to streaks.9
9 An alternative interpretation of the results in Panel B of Table 5
can be obtained from a broadly defined factor that buys all stocks
with positive earnings surprises and sells those with negative earn-
ings surprises in the most recent quarter. Although its ability to
explain PEAD is marginally better than the streak factor’s, the abil-
ity of this positive-minus-negative SURP factor to reduce PEAD’s
alpha is primarily due to the subset of streaks. Overall, although
the signs of earnings surprises are crucial to return predictability,
their ability to explain PEAD requires further conditioning on the
signs of earnings surprises before the most recent quarter. Conse-
quently, the interaction between the sign of the most recent SURP
and the presence of a streak is responsible for PEAD.
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Table 5 Magnitude of Earnings Surprises within Streaks and Reversals
Panel A: Four-factor alphas
SURP quintiles sorted within streaks or reversals
Smallest 2 3 4 Largest Spread
Streaks −00500∗∗∗ −00180∗∗ 00027 00224∗∗ 00433∗∗∗ 00934∗∗∗
4−60015 4−20235 400335 420575 450535 490375
Reversals 00042 00105 00128 00043 00103 00061
400615 410205 410385 400555 410235 400685
Difference −00543∗∗∗ −00284∗∗∗ −00100 00181∗∗ 00330∗∗∗ 00873∗∗∗
4−60565 4−30955 4−10405 420585 440005 460215
Average number of stocks per month
Streaks 564 618 652 625 567
Reversals 269 275 309 282 269
Panel B: Time-series regressions
Four-factor Reduction Streak SURP-sign Purged streak
Model alpha in alpha (%) MrkRf SMB HML UMD factor factor factor
1 00648∗∗∗ NA 00065∗∗∗ −00129∗∗∗ −00080∗∗∗ 00088∗∗∗
490355 440015 4−60075 4−30385 460285
2 00196∗∗∗ 70 00008 −00025∗ 00100∗∗∗ 00035∗∗∗ 00751∗∗∗
440255 400795 4−10885 460145 440055 4220185
3 00567∗∗∗ 13 00053∗∗∗ −00133∗∗∗ −00081∗∗∗ 00055∗∗∗ 00579∗∗∗
480215 430355 4−60505 4−30565 430595 440705
4 00154∗∗∗ 76 00002 −00031∗∗ 00094∗∗∗ 00015 00731∗∗∗ 00383∗∗∗
430445 400165 4−20395 460045 410595 4220455 450225
5 00298∗∗∗ 54 00022∗ −00032∗∗ 00083∗∗∗ 00064∗∗∗ 00677∗∗∗
450765 410925 4−20085 440435 460555 4170415
Notes. This table reports the returns associated with the magnitude of earnings surprises within streaks and reversals over the 1987 to 2009 sample period.
SURP denotes a firm’s quarterly earnings surprise defined as I/B/E/S actual earnings minus the most recent mean consensus estimate, scaled by its stock
price. Stocks are first separated into streaks whose length is at least two, and reversals occur when a streak ends. Second, within each streak or reversal
portfolio, firms are further sorted into SURP quintiles every month based on the magnitude of their most recent SURP. The stock remains in the relevant
portfolio for six months, and stocks with lagged prices below five dollars are excluded from our trading strategies. Equally weighted returns are computed each
month, and the time series of these monthly returns less the risk-free rate are regressed on the four-factor model to obtain alpha estimates that are reported
as percentages in Panel B. In Panel B, the time series of monthly portfolio returns from the hedged SURP 5–1 portfolio are regressed on excess market returns
(MrkRf), size (SMB), value (HML), and momentum (UMD) factors as well as a streak factor. The streak factor is defined as the monthly returns from the trading
strategy in Panel A of Table 3. The SURP-sign factor is long stocks with positive earnings surprises that are not in the streak portfolio and short stocks with
negative earnings surprises that are also not in the streak portfolio. The purged streak factor is the original streak factor orthogonalized against this SURP-sign
factor.
∗10%, ∗∗5%, and ∗∗∗1% statistical significance levels of abnormal returns, with the associated t-statistics in parentheses.
4.4. Alternative Trend Definition
Besides streaks of consecutive earnings surprises with
the same sign, we also examine trends that arise from
consistency within the sign of prior earnings surprises.
A trend occurs when the sign of the most recent quar-
terly earnings surprise is the same sign as the major-
ity (50%) of prior earnings surprises. When exactly
half a firm’s prior earnings surprises are nonposi-
tive, its imbalance is also classified as negative. These
imbalances proxy for the likelihood functions under-
lying the quasi-Bayesian theories that motivate our
empirical tests. Intuitively, when the majority of a
firm’s prior earnings surprises are positive, a positive
earnings surprise produces a positive trend, whereas
a negative earnings surprise produces a negative
reversal. The following diagrams illustrate a positive
trend and a negative reversal, respectively:
Positive imbalance︷ ︸︸ ︷+ +− + ++ + +− + + +︸︷︷︸
Most
recent
−→ positive trend3
Positive imbalance︷ ︸︸ ︷+ +− + ++ + +− + + −︸︷︷︸
Most
recent
−→ negative reversal0
This general definition of trends defined by consis-
tency encompass streaks as a special case. For exam-
ple, a streak of four consecutive positive surprises
requires the most recent surprise to be positive while
also requiring the positive imbalance in a firm’s prior
Loh and Warachka: Streaks in Earnings Surprises and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns
Management Science 58(7), pp. 1305–1321, © 2012 INFORMS 1315
three surprises to equal its maximum of 100%. In con-
trast, according to the gambler’s fallacy, if 9 of the
last 10 draws at a roulette wheel are red, then black
is perceived to be more likely for the next draw
than red regardless of when the black draw occurred.
Unlike streaks, the imbalances that define trends do
not depend on the exact sequencing of prior earnings
surprises. Indeed, trends based on consistency can be
defined over a firm’s entire history of prior earnings
surprises, although streaks longer than 10 quarters
occur infrequently in our sample. Furthermore, all
earnings surprises can be classified into either trends
or reversals using the consistency definition. In con-
trast, the streak definition that requires at least two
consecutive surprises of the same sign is not able to
classify alternating sequences (such as when a posi-
tive SURP is followed by a negative SURP and then
another positive SURP).
The exact number of prior earnings surprises that
investors condition on when forming their expecta-
tions is unknown. Using a large number of prior earn-
ings surprises may obscure the distinction between
trends and reversals. For example, suppose 20 pos-
itive earnings surprises follow 30 negative earnings
surprises. Although the majority of the past 50 earn-
ings surprises are negative, investors may focus on
the most recent 20 earnings surprises that are positive.
Therefore, we examine imbalances over prior hori-
zons ranging from one to five years.10 To be included
in the long or short portfolio of our trading strategies,
stocks are required to have earnings announcements
in the specified prior horizon. According to Table 6,
the number of stocks included in these portfolios
increases as the prior horizon becomes shorter.
As with streaks, the results in Table 6 indicate
that trends defined by consistency predict returns,
whereas reversals are usually associated with insignif-
icant return predictability. The return predictability
of trends is relatively stable and significant across
each horizon, with our trading strategy generating a
return between 0.608% (five years) and 0.873% (two
years). In contrast, reversals only induce significant
return predictability, albeit a mere 0.217%, at the
one-year horizon, and all five reversal quintiles have
insignificant returns when consistency is defined over
a three-year horizon. Overall, the stronger return pre-
dictability of trends compared to reversals is robust
to different horizons over which imbalances in past
SURPs are computed.11
10 We also examine consistency defined using prior earnings sur-
prises over the firm’s entire history and reach similar conclusions.
11 A purged consistency factor that parallels our earlier purged
streak factor achieves a similar level of success in reducing PEAD’s
four-factor alpha. In particular, 49% (52%) of PEAD’s four-factor
alpha is removed when consistency is defined using SURPs over
the prior three years (two years).
4.5. Fama–MacBeth Regressions
Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions confirm our
earlier portfolio-level results with additional control
variables. Several specifications of the following cross-
sectional regressions are estimated whose dependent
variable, Rt+11 t+6, denotes six-month buy-and-hold
returns of individual stocks:
Rt+11 t+6
= 0 +1Betat +2 logBMt +3 logSizet +4PRETt
+5SURPt +6SURPPt +7SURPNt +8Streakt
+9StreakPt +10StreakNt +11Consistencyt
+12LagSURPt +13Lag2SURPt +14
∑
LagSURPt
+Á′X + 0 (2)
A firm’s market beta is estimated using monthly
returns over the prior three calendar years, whereas
BM ratios and size, which represents a firm’s mar-
ket capitalization, are measured according to Fama
and French (2006). PRET denotes past buy-and-hold
returns over the prior 12 months after omitting the
most recent month. The most recent earnings sur-
prise is also divided into positive and negative sur-
prises, where the SURPP and SURPN variables equal
SURP when it is positive and negative, respectively,
and zero otherwise. Thus, these continuous variables
differentiate between positive and negative earnings
surprises. The Streak variable is defined as
+1 for positive streaks1
0 otherwise1
−1 for negative streaks
for streaks of at least two consecutive quarters. The
positive and negative components of the Streak vari-
able, denoted by StreakP and StreakN , are dummy vari-
ables (not continuous variables) that equal one when
the Streak variable is positive or negative, and zero
otherwise. The Consistency variable is defined as
+1 if the majority of prior earnings surprises and
the most recent SURP are positive,
0 otherwise1
−1 if the majority of prior earnings surprises and
the most recent SURP are negative0
The majority is determined using earnings surprises
over the prior three years. We also control for the
magnitude of prior earnings surprises because returns
may capture the cumulative return continuation fol-
lowing earnings surprises before the most recent
quarter. Lagged earnings surprises, denoted LagSURP
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Table 6 Using Consistency to Define Trends
SURP quintiles
Smallest 2 3 4 Largest Spread
5 years of past SURPs used to define consistency
Trends −00250∗∗ −00041 00217∗∗ 00305∗∗∗ 00358∗∗∗ 00608∗∗∗
4−20445 4−00405 420215 430255 430585 450215
Reversals 00174∗ 00211∗∗ 00228∗∗ 00212∗∗ 00036 −00138
410665 420265 420355 420085 400275 4−10015
Difference −00424∗∗∗ −00252∗∗∗ −00011 00093 00322∗∗ 00746∗∗∗
4−40295 4−30205 4−00205 410305 420585 440225
Average number of stocks per month
Trends 181 247 360 306 287
Reversals 306 311 474 354 267
4 years of past SURPs used to define consistency
Trends −00418∗∗∗ −00125 00018 00271∗∗∗ 00419∗∗∗ 00837∗∗∗
4−40695 4−10365 410265 430035 440675 470915
Reversals 00055 00091 00140 00176∗ 00205∗∗ 00151∗
400615 410065 410635 410945 420545 410685
Difference −00473∗∗∗ −00215∗∗∗ −00032 00095 00214∗∗∗ 00686∗∗∗
4−50715 4−30205 4−00645 410405 420645 450155
3 years of past SURPs used to define consistency
Trends −00474∗∗∗ −00046 00115 00271∗∗∗ 00355∗∗∗ 00828∗∗∗
4−40985 4−00415 410365 430005 430965 470565
Reversals 00067 00126 00139 00170 00133 00066
400685 410485 410435 410545 410345 400665
Difference −00541∗∗∗ −00172∗ −00024 00101 00221∗∗ 00762∗∗∗
4−50795 4−10865 4−00365 410085 420315 450425
2 years of past SURPs used to define consistency
Trends −00418∗∗∗ −00154∗ 00089 00280∗∗∗ 00455∗∗∗ 00873∗∗∗
4−40895 4−10705 410065 430075 450095 480255
Reversals 00164∗ 00130 00131 00165∗ 00238∗∗∗ 00074
410955 410505 410495 410955 430065 400865
Difference −00582∗∗∗ −00284∗∗∗ −00042 00115∗ 00217∗∗∗ 00798∗∗∗
4−70085 4−30845 4−00835 410865 420685 450915
1 year of past SURPs used to define consistency
Trends −00350∗∗∗ −00111 00088 00290∗∗∗ 00414∗∗∗ 00764∗∗∗
4−40185 4−10245 410065 420955 440495 470115
Reversals 00088 00068 00130 00168∗∗ 00305∗∗∗ 00217∗∗∗
410095 400805 410485 420125 440085 420735
Difference −00438∗∗∗ −00179∗∗ −00043 00122∗ 00109 00547∗∗∗
4−50415 4−20505 4−00955 410805 410345 440105
Average number of stocks per month
Trends 199 261 451 481 481
Reversals 555 501 633 417 334
Notes. This table reports the returns from calendar-time strategies from 1987 to 2009. A trend is defined by the consistency between the sign of prior SURPs
and the most recent SURP. A trend (reversal) occurs when the most recent SURP has the same (opposite) sign as the majority of a firm’s prior SURPs. Each
panel shows consistency based on prior horizons ranging from one to five years. At a minimum, stocks are required to have past SURPs over the relevant
horizon. Because the analyst forecasts start in 1984, portfolio formation for the five-year window starts in 1989. SURP is a firm’s quarterly earnings surprise
(I/B/E/S actual earnings minus the most recent mean consensus forecast) scaled by its stock price. Each month, firms are sorted into quintiles based on their
most recent SURP. Stock are held for six months and stocks with lagged prices below five dollars are excluded. Equally weighted returns are computed each
month and the time series of these monthly returns less the risk-free rate are regressed on the four-factor model to obtain alpha estimates that are reported
as percentages. For brevity, the average number of stocks per month is omitted over the two-, three-, and four-year horizons.
∗10%, ∗∗5%, and ∗∗∗1% statistical significance, with the associated t-statistics in parentheses.
and Lag2SURP for previous horizons of three to six
months and six to nine months, respectively, are
included to address this possibility. We also include
the sum of all a firm’s prior earnings surprises,
denoted, by
∑
LagSURP, excluding the most recent
quarterly earnings surprise.12 All SURP variables are
winsorized at the 0.1 percentiles to mitigate the effects
12 Excluding LagSURP and Lag2SURP from this sum does not alter
our results.
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of outliers. The X vector contains an array of control
variables that account for cross-sectional differences
in firm characteristics pertaining to liquidity, infor-
mation transmission, and uncertainty. These variables
include square of SURP, Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity
measure, idiosyncratic volatility, log of turnover, ana-
lyst forecast dispersion, log of one plus analyst cover-
age, and institutional ownership.13
Table 7 reports the time-series averages of the
monthly Fama–MacBeth coefficients (multiplied by
100). The standard errors associated with the
t-statistics are Newey–West adjusted with six lags
because the returns are generated from overlapping
six-month horizons. The premium for exposure to
market-level return fluctuations, the value premium,
and the size premium are captured by the 1, 2, and
3 coefficients, respectively, whereas the 4 coefficient
for PRET is consistent with price momentum. The
positive 5 coefficients for SURP are consistent with
the existing PEAD literature. Furthermore, the posi-
tive 6 and 7 coefficients indicate that the magnitude
of SURP influences returns for both positive and neg-
ative earnings surprises.
The positive 8 coefficients show that streaks pre-
dict returns. This is the most important finding in
Table 7. In particular, consistent with the returns
from our first trading strategy, the positive 8 coeffi-
cient implies that positive streaks and negative streaks
result in higher returns and lower returns, respec-
tively. The positive 9 and 10 coefficients confirm
that positive and negative streaks predict returns.
Nonetheless, the Consistency variable also predicts
returns because its 11 coefficients are positive, even
after controlling for streaks. Thus, investors do not
appear to focus exclusively on the most recent
sequence of consecutively positive or negative earn-
ings surprises. Moreover, the magnitudes of earn-
ings surprises during the prior six to nine months
(LagSURP and Lag2SURP) have insignificant 12 and
13 coefficients. The insignificant 14 coefficient that
pertains to the sum of all lagged earnings surprises
is also insignificant. This shows that the return pre-
dictability of streaks is not driven by the same-signed
earnings surprises prior to the most recent earnings
surprise.
5. Robustness Tests
This section demonstrates the robustness of our
results to various alternative specifications and com-
13 In unreported tests, we include analysts’ consensus long-term
growth forecast as a control and find that these forecasts exert
no influence on the return predictability of streaks. This test
addresses the concern that streaks are associated with higher
growth prospects and hence higher expected returns as a conse-
quence of greater risk.
peting hypotheses. It also discusses and tests addi-
tional predictions of the gambler’s fallacy.
5.1. Prior Literature
Barth et al. (1999) as well as Myers et al. (2007)
document that firms with increasing earnings have
higher valuations but large price decreases follow-
ing the termination of earnings increases. However,
these studies examine contemporaneous returns in
the quarter in which earnings are announced. In con-
trast, we examine returns after earnings are reported
using calendar-time trading strategies to evaluate the
return predictability of trends.
We replicate the estimation in Barth et al. (1999).
These authors examine annual changes in accounting
net income using a panel regression. Despite our use
of quarterly SURPs and a different time period, we
are able to replicate the essence of their findings using
a Fama–MacBeth regression. Beginning with Table 7,
we define the next quarter’s future return as the three-
month buy-and-hold return starting one month after
the most recent SURP, whereas the contemporane-
ous quarter’s return is defined using the three-month
return ending in the month of the most recent SURP
announcement. Following the Barth et al. (1999) spec-
ification (their Table 5, Panel B), we interact SURP
with a dummy variable that equals one when there is
a positive streak whose length is at least two. We also
interact SURP with a dummy variable for negative
reversals that equals one when a positive streak is
ended by the most recent SURP being negative.
Using contemporaneous returns as the dependent
variable, Barth et al. (1999) report that coefficients
for the streak and reversal interactions are positive
and negative, respectively. In unreported results, we
obtain similar evidence. However, when we inves-
tigate future returns, the reversal interaction is no
longer economically nor statistically significant. This
finding implies that the market does not underre-
act to reversals. In contrast to reversals, the coeffi-
cient for the streak interaction remains significantly
positive when future returns are examined. Over-
all, the market appears to underreact less to rever-
sals than streaks because reversals exert a larger
(smaller) impact on contemporaneous (future) returns
than streaks. Therefore, consistent with the results in
Table 7, this evidence suggests that investors under-
react to streaks.
Our paper is further distinguished from the exist-
ing accounting literature given its focus on analyst-
based earnings surprises that account for earnings
predictability. Our more recent sample period and the
use of quarterly earnings surprises rather than annual
earnings announcements also differ from the existing
literature.
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Table 7 Fama–MacBeth Regressions
Regression specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Beta 00292 00259 00255 00225 00235 00240 00202
400355 400315 400315 400275 400285 400295 400325
Log(BM ) 10115∗∗ 10065∗∗ 10045∗∗ 10128∗∗ 10091∗∗ 10093∗∗ 00802∗
420185 420095 420055 420215 420145 420155 410745
Log(Size) −00066 −00124 −00125 −00150 −00147 −00150 −00628∗∗
4−00285 4−00545 4−00565 4−00665 4−00645 4−00665 4−20435
PRET 20203∗∗ 10506 10499 10702 10497 10467 10727
420045 410435 410415 410605 410425 410385 410475
SURP 250581∗∗∗ 180693∗∗∗ 190407∗∗∗ 170956∗∗∗ 210298∗∗∗ 100430
440575 440055 430785 430755 440845 410405
SURP P 230866∗∗∗
420955
SURP N 310468∗
410845
Streak 10454∗∗∗ 00887∗∗∗ 00848∗∗∗ 00760∗∗∗
490235 450265 450085 440625
Streak P dummy 10062∗∗∗
440645
Streak N dummy −10795∗∗∗
4−110025
Consistency 10398∗∗∗ 00785∗∗∗ 00782∗∗∗ 00639∗∗∗
480605 440415 440475 430765
LagSURP 50062 40411
400985 400675
Lag2SURP 40456 60189
400765 400995
Sum of all lagged SURPs 00127 −00353
400775 4−10225
Squared SURP −870844∗∗
4−20085
Amihud’s (2002) measure −00195
4−10055
Idiosyncratic volatility −620259∗∗∗
4−30295
Log(turnover) −00173
4−00505
Dispersion −00084
4−00435
Log(1 + analyst coverage) 10195∗∗∗
420865
Institutional ownership −00695
4−00605
Number of months 276 276 276 276 276 276 276
Number of firm-months 2,277 2,277 2,277 2,277 2,277 2,277 1,944
Notes. Each month, six-month buy-and-hold returns are regressed on the independent variables in Equation (2). Time-series averages
of the monthly coefficients (multiplied by 100) from 1987 to 2009 are then reported. An intercept is estimated but unreported. A firm’s
market beta is estimated using monthly returns over the prior three years, size is last June’s market cap, BM is book divided by market
equity, and PRET is buy-and-hold returns over the prior 12 months, skipping the most recent month. Streak is +1 for positive streaks
(at least two consecutive positive SURPs), −1 for negative streaks, and 0 otherwise. Consistency is +1 4−15 whenever the sign of the
majority of a firm’s prior earnings surprises over a three-year horizon is positive (negative) and the most recent SURP is also positive
(negative), and 0 otherwise. SURP is a firm’s most recent quarterly earnings surprise (I/B/E/S actual earnings less the mean consensus
forecast) scaled by its stock price. SURP P equals SURP for positive values and zero otherwise. Streak P is a dummy variable for positive
streaks. Other control variables include lagged SURPs, sum of all lagged SURPs, squared SURPs, Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure,
idiosyncratic volatility, log of turnover, analyst forecast dispersion, log of one plus analyst coverage, and institutional ownership. All SURP
variables are winsorized at the extreme 0.1 percentiles. Stocks with lagged prices below five dollars are excluded.
∗10%, ∗∗5%, and ∗∗∗1% statistical significance levels, with Newey–West t-statistics with six lags in parentheses.
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5.2. Earnings Surprise Autocorrelation
Analyst-based earnings surprises are not highly
autocorrelated because analysts are able to adjust
their forecasts to account for earnings predictabil-
ity.14 However, Chan et al. (2007) document that in
recent years, analyst incentives caused analysts to
systematically underestimate earnings, thereby allow-
ing management to beat the consensus forecast.
The implication of this bias is that firms reporting
earnings that marginally exceed consensus forecasts
should not be classified as having positive earnings
surprises. To address this issue, we repeat our tests by
classifying SURPs as positive if they exceed the cross-
sectional median of all SURPs in the past 90 days,
and negative otherwise. Under this classification, we
find nearly identical results (unreported) as those in
Table 3. This similarity provides assurance that our
results are insensitive to the potential misclassification
of small positive surprises.
The second test we conduct directly relates to
the autocorrelation in SURPs. Positive autocorrela-
tion within earnings surprises would increase the
likelihood of streaks. Although Rabin and Vayanos
(2010) demonstrate that the underreaction to streaks
predicted by the gambler’s fallacy applies to auto-
correlated sequences, Bernard and Thomas (1990)
hypothesize that PEAD is caused by investors under-
estimating the positive autocorrelation in earnings
surprises. Thus, Bernard and Thomas (1990) hypothe-
size that streaks are informative, but investors ignore
their informativeness. To test this hypothesis, we
examine a subset of firms whose earnings surprises
are independent according to the runs test (Campbell
et al. 1996) as well as a four-lag autoregressive model.
The first subset of independent quarterly SURPs is
obtained by applying the runs test at the 10% sig-
nificance level to firm-level earnings surprises. The
runs test begins in January 1987 for firms with at least
12 quarterly earnings surprises. According to the runs
test at the 10% significance level, the subset of obser-
vations whose earnings surprises defined by analyst
forecasts are autocorrelated comprises only 22.28% of
our sample. Thus, the majority of firms have analyst-
based earnings surprises that are not autocorrelated.
The second subset of stocks with independent earn-
ings surprises is defined by the following autoregres-
sive model:
SURPt = 0 +1SURPt−1 +2SURPt−2 +3SURPt−3
+4SURPt−4 + t0 (3)
14 Earning surprises defined relative to realized earnings (SUEs),
as in Chordia and Shivakumar (2006), produce similar results
as analyst-based earnings surprises. However, besides being
more autocorrelated, SUEs are skewed toward positive earnings
surprises.
This regression accounts for regularities in con-
secutive firm-level earnings surprises that may arise
from earnings management or analyst forecast biases.
Firms having an R2 from Equation (3) below 0.25 are
placed in the independent subset. A low R2 indicates
that the magnitude (hence, sign) of a firm’s earnings
surprise next quarter is difficult to predict. We repli-
cate our earlier trading strategies using the indepen-
dent and autocorrelated subsets.
In unreported results, streaks continue to induce
significantly stronger return predictability than rever-
sals in the independent subset as well as the auto-
correlated subset. This finding applies to independent
SURPs defined by the runs test and the autoregres-
sive model. Indeed, reversals are not associated with
significant return predictability, whereas streaks yield
significant risk-adjusted returns in all but the mid-
dle quintile. Return predictability from streaks also
exceeds that from reversals. Thus, the results for inde-
pendent and autocorrelated SURPs parallel our earlier
results in Panel B of Table 3.
We conclude that the return implications of streaks
is not driven by the positive autocorrelation in
earnings surprises. Instead, our results suggest that
investors condition on uninformative streaks in earn-
ings surprises.
5.3. Short-Sale Constraints and Limited Attention
To determine if short-sale constraints explain our
results, we proxy for short-sale constraints using low
institutional ownership because investors cannot eas-
ily borrow shares in these firms. Unreported results
confirm that short-sale constraints cannot explain the
return predictability of streaks because the stronger
return predictability of streaks relative to reversals is
equally apparent for firms with high or low insti-
tutional ownership. Therefore, short-sale constraints
do not appear to drive the return predictability of
streaks.
Instead of short-sale constraints, limited attention
provides an alternative characterization of our results.
Hirshleifer et al. (2009) and DellaVigna and Pollet
(2009) find that investors are less attentive on days
with more earnings announcements and on Fridays,
respectively. To test this alternative explanation, we
check whether streaks tend to occur more on low
attention days compared to reversals. We find that the
percentage of Friday announcements for streaks and
reversals is almost identical, at 11.43% and 11.45%,
respectively. The average number of firms making
announcements is also nearly identical for earnings
announcements classified as streaks (133.7) or rever-
sals (133.0). Hence, limited attention is unlikely to be
an explanation for the stronger return predictability
of streaks.
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5.4. Earnings Uncertainty and Diffuse Priors
Our next analysis tests whether long streaks induce
less return predictability than short streaks when
investors priors are more diffuse. According to Rabin
(2002) the gambler’s fallacy is predicted to be weaker
for longer streaks when investors have more diffuse
priors regarding the underlying long-term distribu-
tion of signals. Specifically, diffuse investor beliefs
allow the hot-hands phenomenon to undermine the
gambler’s fallacy following long streaks.
We proxy for a diffuse prior regarding future earn-
ings with high realized volatility and high analyst
forecast dispersion. We then test whether the return
predictability of long streaks is weaker for firms with
high realized earnings uncertainty and high analyst
forecast dispersion. This exercise replicates Table 4 for
both these subsets of firms.
Unreported results confirm that the return pre-
dictability following streaks of at least 10 is weaker
for firms with high earnings variability or high fore-
cast dispersion. Thus, as predicted by Rabin (2002),
the gambler’s fallacy appears to be weaker when
investors have more diffuse prior beliefs.
5.5. Abnormal Turnover
Provided investors condition on different information
sets, Rabin and Vayanos (2010) predict that trad-
ing volume would be higher in portfolios contain-
ing streaks than reversals. We test this hypothesis
using the average abnormal turnover during the six-
month holding period. Abnormal turnover is defined
as turnover in a particular month divided by the
portfolio’s average turnover in the prior six months,
minus one. Unreported results reveal that the average
abnormal holding-period turnover is higher for firms
in the streak portfolio than for firms in the reversal
portfolio. This evidence is consistent with an initial
underreaction to streaks that leads to greater trad-
ing volume in the subsequent holding period. Con-
sequently, abnormal turnover is consistent with the
gambler’s fallacy.
6. Conclusions
We find that streaks consisting of consecutive quar-
terly earnings surprises with the same sign have
important return implications. A trading strategy
that conditions on streaks defined by at least two
prior earnings surprises yields a significant four-
factor adjusted return of 0.603% per month. This
strategy buys stocks with positive streaks and sells
stocks with negative streaks while ignoring the mag-
nitude of earnings surprises. Conversely, the four-
factor adjusted return from conditioning on reversals,
which correspond to the termination of streaks, is
insignificant. The difference between the return on the
streaks strategy and the reversals strategy is also eco-
nomically and statistically significant.
We also assess the return predictability of streaks
after accounting for the magnitude of the most recent
earnings surprises. After sorting firms into quintiles
according to the magnitude of their most recent earn-
ings surprise, we divide these quintiles into portfo-
lios of streaks and reversals. We then buy stocks with
positive streaks in the highest quintile and sell stocks
with negative streaks in the lowest quintile. A four-
factor alpha of 0.882% per month is obtained from
this trading strategy. Again, this strategy’s return is
significantly higher than that of a similar strategy that
conditions on reversals.
Our results show that PEAD is limited to streaks.
Indeed, a streak factor from the returns of our
first trading strategy explains 54% of PEAD’s four-
factor alpha. Therefore, despite being a cross-sectional
anomaly, PEAD has a significant time series compo-
nent. Fama–MacBeth regressions confirm the return
predictability of streaks after controlling for a variety
of firm characteristics that include earnings surprises
before the most recent quarter. We also confirm that
the autocorrelation in quarterly earnings surprises is
not driving our results.
In summary, our results indicate that investor
expectations are influenced by trends in prior quar-
terly earnings surprises. Our evidence supports the
gambler’s fallacy in Rabin (2002) because investors
appear to underreact to trends in earnings surprises.
One interesting avenue for future research is to exam-
ine the link between the gambler’s fallacy and price
momentum. Preliminary evidence from our Fama–
MacBeth regressions indicates that price momentum
is insignificant after controlling for trends in earnings
surprises.
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